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Abstract
I examine the co-variance between tri-party repurchase agreement (repo) spreads and
proxies for collateral values and counterparty risk. Since the Global Financial Crisis of
2008 (GFC), the Federal Reserve (Fed) has taken measures to mitigate repo market
instability. These measures have collectively placed the Fed astride repo markets as
ongoing borrower, lender and purchaser of US Treasury and Agency securities. By
analyzing the relationships between repo spreads, the US 10-year yield and the TED
spread, I assess the effectiveness of Fed measures to mitigate repo market instability. Using
multiple breakpoint Bai-Perron regression and Markov Switching tests, I find that these
measures have been effective, with accompanying unintended consequences.
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1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the literature by assessing the Fed’s success in mitigating repo markets’
structural instability. I examine the covariance of tri-party repo spreads with proxies for two state
variables: counterparty risk and collateral values. Collateral risk is the risk that the borrower’s
collateral becomes less valuable than the loan’s face value, potentially prompting default.
Counterparty risk is the risk of borrower non-performance. If the Fed has been successful in
mitigating investor perceptions of these risks, repo spreads should covary negatively with proxies
for counterparty risk. Additionally, repo spreads should not covary positively with long-term bond
yields. Taken together, this would mean tri-party repo markets continue to be viewed as safe haven
assets in times of financial stress and declining collateral values.

Repo contracts are short-term loans secured by portfolios of medium- and long-term bonds.
Money market funds typically lend in tri-party repo, where a clearing agent manages collateral, in
order to minimize administrative and counterparty risks. Primary dealer banks act as intermediaries
by borrowing from money market funds in tri-party repo and lending in bilateral repo to hedge
funds, pension funds and insurance companies. The latter generally choose bilateral repo markets
because they prefer to manage their own collateral portfolios. As in traditional banking, repo
markets conduct maturity transformation by creating safe, short-term assets using long-term bonds
as collateral. Overcollateralization, which provides a margin of safety in the event of asset value
impairment, is analogous to a bank’s equity in traditional banking.

Repo contracts are designed to assure lender confidence. They supersede bankruptcy
automatic stay laws, so the lender may promptly seize and sell collateral in the event of
counterparty default regardless of borrower legal status. When the collateral is US Treasury or
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Agency securities, the risk of collateral value falling below loan value is low. Counterparty risk
is also low but nonzero as there are administrative costs associated with collateral seizure. In triparty repo, loans are not only overcollateralized, but a clearing agent manages the collateral,
further minimizing counterparty risk.

Tri-party repo daily volumes during 2021 fluctuated

between $2-3 trillion daily nominal value.

Due to its lender-friendly features and Fed support, repos may be considered a safe asset
and therefore a substitute for other safe assets like Treasury bills. If an asset is considered risky,
its yield spread against Treasury bills will rise during periods of elevated financial stress. If an
asset is considered safe, the spread against Treasury bills will fall or remain stable. Any additional
yield in repo over T bills can be considered a negative convenience yield on T bills, widely viewed
as among the safest short-term bonds (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).

Because repo markets have grown much faster than bank deposits in recent years, the
question of whether repo markets produce safe assets is significant. As the Secured Overnight
Financing Rate (SOFR) is scheduled to succeed LIBOR as the primary derivative contract
reference rate in 2023, the systemic importance of collateralized markets will continue to expand
even though they are periodically unstable. During the GFC, a systemic crisis was prompted by
declining repo collateral values, particularly in subprime mortgages. Since then, regulations have
encouraged repo participants to use only the safest collateral: US Treasury and Agency securities.
However, the events of March 2020 revealed that the safest collateral may experience volatility
and illiquidity.

The literature provides substantial empirical evidence of instability in collateralized
lending markets. Analogous to bank runs, perceptions of risk can combine with first-mover
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incentives to create conditions conducive to asset fire sales. Despite this, post-Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) bank and market structure regulations continue to favor collateralized over unsecured
lending. Over time, the Fed has adopted several measures that address repo market instabilities.
Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPS), originally deployed to ease monetary policy at the zerolower bound, have provided direct, persistent buying support for US Treasury and Agency
securities which serve as collateral for repo loans. The Fed has also developed specific programs
to support repo markets such as the overnight reverse repo facility (ONRRF) and the standing repo
facility (SRF). Henceforth, I will refer to these developments collectively as the secured lending
regime.

This paper attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of secured lending regime measures at
stabilizing repo markets. My first hypothesis is that repo spreads over Treasury bill yields are
uncorrelated with US Treasury security and Agency MBS yields. Because long-term US Treasury
and Agency MBS serve as collateral, changes in collateral value reflected in yield changes could
be transmitted into tri-party repo spreads. Ongoing and contingent Fed direct support for collateral
values may neutralize this collateral supply effect. The second hypothesis is that repo spreads
covary negatively with counterparty risk. Due to its lender-friendly characteristics and Fed support
via the secured lending regime measures, tri-party repo will be viewed by market participants as a
safe haven asset, similar to Treasury bills. When counterparty risk is elevated, market participants
will compress tri-party repo yield spreads.

The literature review section highlights collateralized market instability, central bank
responses to this instability and the collateral supply channel of interest rate determination. Section
3 describes the data used to assess repo spread association with proxies for counterparty risk and
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collateral values. Sections 5 and 6 describe the methodologies employed to assess associations
among the variables. Section 7 summarizes the findings and explores the costs and benefits of
central bank support of repo markets.

2. Literature Review

Repo markets may experience liquidity spiral dynamics similar to bank runs. Through examination
of collateral haircuts (overcollateralization) in repo loans, Gorton and Metrick (2012) and Gorton
et al (2020) illustrate the “run” on subprime mortgage repo and spillover effects to other
collateralized credit markets. They provide evidence that the run correlated with broad
counterparty risk concerns rather than specific fears about subprime mortgage values and is
analogous to historical bank runs prior to government deposit insurance schemes. The effect of the
2008 run on repo was the same as in the 1930s bank runs: a collapse in the money supply. While
Gorton & Metrick (2012) find significant evidence of a run on repo in bilateral repo markets,
Copeland et al (2014) and find evidence of stability in tri-party repo markets where Treasury and
Agency securities serve as collateral.

Gabor (2016) argues that instability is inherent in repo market architecture because
continuous market-based liquidity is falsely assumed. Repo loan collateral is not subject to
bankruptcy automatic stay laws, therefore the lender is free to seize and sell collateral when the
loan enters default, regardless of borrower legal status. When collateral markets become volatile,
lenders may simultaneously demand more onerous terms, such as greater haircuts. Borrowers will
be left with assets that can secure declining short-term loan amounts and may seek to sell assets.
Collateral values decline in step with larger haircuts, conveying an incentive to sell ahead of others.
These dynamics can lead to fire sales featuring severe illiquidity and collapsing asset prices.

6
Durable financial stability cannot rest on the false assumption of continuously liquid government
bond and repo markets, because market-based liquidity is subject to periodic interruption, as noted
by Keynes (1930).

Repo markets may increase systemic risk by imposing real-time mark-to-market collateral
pricing discipline. Prior to the emergence of collateralized markets, safe assets were primarily
produced by banks in the form of unsecured deposits. When markets became volatile, illiquid
assets could be “hidden” on bank balance sheets until markets stabilized (Sissoko, 2016). During
such periods, central banks could lend to solvent financial institutions which could intermediate
the liquidity where it was needed until confidence was restored. Collateral portfolios are markedto-market in real time, so impaired asset values and volatility are public information, forcing
market participants to react in real time.

Collateralized money markets are becoming the dominant producer of safe assets,
supplanting bank deposits (Gorton et al, 2018). Because long-term bonds are monetized in repo
markets, their dominance gives rise to a collateral supply channel of information transmission.
During the GFC, declining collateral values dramatically impacted short-term risk premia. Longterm collateral values are impacted not only by credit quality, but also duration changes, therefore
long-term interest rate volatility should logically be expected to impact short-term interest rates.

In the literature, long-term interest rates have been generally theorized as the expected path
of short-term rates plus a risk premium (Collin-Dufresne et al, 2001). Transmission of information
from long-term rate markets to short is less studied, but relevant as collateralized markets supplant
unsecured in the secured lending regime. In an examination of repo markets during 2002-2016,
Singh & Goel (2019) present evidence that long-term collateral values impact short-term risk
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premia. The authors show that there is a collateral supply channel of monetary policy transmission
that may not be well-understood by central banks. Because global money-center banks routinely
rehypothecate collateral, the authors theorize that unwinding central bank balance sheets may have
an easing effect on monetary policy by releasing quality collateral into repo markets. This is
contrary to the standard central banking dogma that unwinding central bank balance sheets is
equivalent to raising policy rates.

The rise of collateralized markets has had significant consequences for central banks. Since
the adoption of the floor system of monetary policy in 2008, the Fed has been forced into
successive permanent interventions to maintain repo market stability (Nelson, 2021). March 2020
was illustrative of this process. After the primary dealer credit facility (PDLF) was re-introduced
in response to Treasury market illiquidity, limited participation forced the Fed to significantly
increase direct Treasury purchases. He et al. (2021) use a preferred habitat model of the Treasury
market to illustrate that primary dealer balance sheet constraints prevented rapid intermediation of
liquidity demands resulting in severe illiquidity and volatility. Treasury market illiquidity during
the Covid-19 crisis demonstrated that the inherent weakness of repo markets is not resolved by
assuring the quality of the underlying collateral or by having the Fed act as repo counterparty.
Only massive, direct purchases will suffice when private market participants decline to provide
liquidity. The Fed stabilized repo markets during a two-week span in March by purchasing directly
$700 billion of Treasuries in two weeks and committing to upsize quantitative easing to $120
billion per month indefinitely. In the three months following mid-March 2020, the Fed purchased
$2.3 trillion of Treasury and Agency MBS securities. Sissoko (2020) addresses why the PDCF and
the SRF are insufficient measures to stabilize an illiquid Treasury market. Even when the Fed is
counterparty to a repo transaction, the borrower retains collateral risk. If collateral values fall, the
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Fed must issue margin calls just like a private-market lender. Obviously, Fed-originated margin
calls would be inconsistent with the SRF’s purpose to stabilize the market. The events of March
2020 provide evidence that only direct purchases will suffice when collateral experiences volatility
due to illiquid markets.

3. Data

The dynamics of TC spreads, yields on 10-year US Treasuries, and TED spread are shown in
Figure 1. The shaded areas in Figure 1 show periods of elevated counterparty concerns, proxied
by the TED spread. During these periods, there is visual evidence of negative correlation with
Treasury-backed (TC) repo spreads. Negative association shows that cash investors bid down repo
spreads during periods of market duress, indicating safe asset status. The evidence is particularly
notable in periods of severely elevated TED: 2008 during the GFC and in March 2020 during the
COVID-19 crisis. There is no visually evident relationship between the US Treasury 10-year yield
and the repo spread in the time series. See also Figure 2 – MC Spreads, US 10-year Yields and
TED Spread.
….. insert Figures 1 and 2 around here …..

Daily data captures volatility shocks better than weekly data, which could mute these effects.
The dataset starts in January 2005 on the commencement of tri-party repo data reporting from
Depository Trust Clearing Corporation. TED spread and 10-year Treasury yield data are from the
St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank (FRED). The dataset has 4112 daily observations between January
6, 2005 and May 4, 20211.

1

See Table 1 – Summary Statistics.
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….. insert Table 1 around here …..

4. Methodology and Results: Bai-Perron Breakpoint Regression

To test whether tri-party repo spreads co-vary with proxies for counterparty risk and collateral
values, I assess the covariance of two dependent variables – TC and Mortgage-backed (MC) repo
spreads with two independent variables: the TED spread and the US 10-year Treasury note yield.
The regression model follows Gorton & Metrick’s 2012 study of bilateral repo spreads’ covariance
with counterparty risk and subprime mortgage values:

10𝑌
3𝑀
3𝑀 )
∆(𝑟1𝛿 − 𝑟𝑡1𝑀 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ∆𝑟𝑡+𝜏1
+ 𝛽2 ∗ ∆(𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡+𝜏2
− 𝑟𝑡+𝜏2
+ 𝛽3 ∗ ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡+𝜏3 ) + 𝛽4
1𝑀
∗ ∆ log(𝑊𝐼𝐿𝑡+𝜏4 ) + 𝛽5 ∗ ∆(𝑟𝑡+𝜏5 ) + 𝜇𝑡
(1)

[(∆𝑟1𝛿 − 𝑟𝑡1𝑀 )] is the repo spread defined as the daily TC or MC repo rate minus the 1-month
Treasury bill yield. The change in the repo spread is regressed against the daily change in the US
10𝑌
10-year Treasury note yield [ ∆𝑟𝑡+𝜏1
] and the daily change in the TED spread
3𝑀
3𝑀 )].
[∆(𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡+𝜏2
− 𝑟𝑡+𝜏2
Subscripts 𝜏 are displacement factors that optimize the regressions by

minimizing the Schwartz information criterion. Control variables are change in the log of VIX
[(𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡+𝜏3 )] ,change in the log of the Wilshire 5000 index [ ∆ log(𝑊𝐼𝐿𝑡+𝜏4 )] and the change in the
1𝑀 )].
3-month Treasury bill yield [∆(𝑟𝑡+𝜏5

Gorton & Metrick’s 2012 model additionally includes as control variables the yield curve
slope and the square of the US 10-year Treasury yield. I omit these here to avoid multicollinearity,
given that one of my state variables is the US 10-year Treasury yield.
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Since secured lending regime measures have been implemented over time, I use Bai-Perron
multiple breakpoint (MBP) regression to find discrete breaks in time series behaviors.
Additionally, traumatic risk events such as the GFC and the Covid-19 crisis may have altered
market participants’ perceptions of risk in tri-party repo. I test TC repo spreads separately from
MC repo spreads to add robustness. The MBP regression results are shown in Table 2.

….. insert Tables 2 and 3 around here …..

The optimized estimations for TC and MC spreads identify single breaks corresponding to
critical GFC events. For TC spreads, this event is August 22, 2007 which is simultaneous with the
suspension of redemptions for 3 BNP Paribas money-market funds. This is widely recognized as
the first systemic event of the GFC. For MC spreads, the break point is September 22, 2008, which
corresponds to the establishment of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) following the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy. While the MBP breakpoints are misaligned, each corresponds to critical
crisis events prior to the implementation of the secured lending regime. For both TC and MC
spreads, I will hereafter refer to the period prior to and after their breaks as Period 1 and Period 2,
respectively.
In Period 1, the estimated coefficients for TC and MC spreads’ regressions against the US
10-year yield are divergent, as TC and MC estimated coefficients show positive and negative
associations, respectively. Both estimated coefficients are statistically significant. This suggests
that repo spreads were correlated with collateral value changes and a collateral supply effect was
operative in Period 1. However, a negative association between repo spreads and yields is
theorized if investors respond to collateral value risk. As yields rise, collateral values fall and
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therefore increase the risk that the collateral value would fall below the repo loan amount. This
hypothesis infers that information is transmitted from long-term values to short-term risk premia.
On the other hand, if short term risk premia rise due to elevated counterparty risk, long-term, highquality bond yields could decline on deflationary expectations. Both dynamics can be
simultaneously active. One effect could overwhelm the other, depending on market conditions.
This paper’s regressions control for counterparty risk, so it is puzzling that TC and MC regressions
would have sign-divergent collateral supply effect coefficients during roughly the same period.

In Period 2, there is no evidence of a collateral supply effect. Following the implementation
of the secured lending regime, both TC and MC spread estimated coefficients are weakly negative
and statistically insignificant. The evidence suggests that there is no linear association between
repo spreads and collateral values. Period 2 commences with Fed reactions to the GFC, including
LSAPs. One explanation for the lack of association is that market participants inferred Fed direct
support of long-term Treasury and Mortgage bonds which effectively neutralized collateral value
risk in repo. This inference was confirmed as correct when the Fed purchased massive quantities
of Treasury securities in March and April 2020.

The MBP estimated results show strong evidence of a negative association between repo
spreads and counterparty risk, indicating that investors view tri-party repo as a safe haven asset
during periods of elevated financial market stress. The TED spread, a measure commonly used by
academicians and practitioners alike, proxies counterparty risk in the regressions.

In Period 1, TC and MC spreads exhibit negative association with TED, although the TC
spread is statistically insignificant. This period pre-dates the implementation of the secured lending
regime and therefore direct Fed support for repo markets, which may explain the TC association
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insignificance. Prior to the secured lending regime, there may have been some level of perceived
counterparty risk in tri-party repo markets.

In Period 2, TC and MC spread estimated coefficients against TED exhibit strong,
statistically significant, negative association.

The estimated results corroborate the graphic

evidence from Figures 1 and 2. Repo spread tightening when the TED spread spikes indicates that
Fed-implemented repo market support structures in the secured lending regime have been
successful in minimizing perceptions of counterparty risk in tri-party repo.

In summary, MBP regressions support both hypotheses of no collateral supply effect and a
negative association between repo spreads and counterparty risk. The regressions provide evidence
of a lack of association between repo spreads and the US 10-year interest rate, indicating that there
is no collateral supply effect following implementation of the secured lending regime.
Furthermore, investors view tri-party repo as a safe haven asset during periods of elevated stress.
Taken together, the MBP regressions proved strong evidence that ONRRF, PDLF, SRF, and
ongoing LSAPs have minimized investor risk perceptions in tri-party repo markets.

5. Methodology and Results: Markov Switching Multifractal Tests

To add robustness to multiple breakpoint regression, I utilize a two-state Markov switching model
to evaluate the stability of relationships among repo spreads, proxies for collateral values and
counterparty risk. The two-state model is indicated by visual inspection of the data as well as MBP
model results. Markov switching is intended to capture non-linear relationships that MBP
regression may not be able to identify. Shifts in regimes may signal changes in the dynamic
behavior of the time series (Hamilton, 1989). Given the change in monetary policy regime in
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response to the GFC, I assess whether variable relationships are state-dependent. Using nonstationary data at level. I specify four equations for two states each for each of TC and MC repo
spreads against the US 10-year yield and the TED spread.

Following Orlowski and Soper (2019), I specify the two-state Markov process for the first
test - repo spread and the US 10-year yield - as follows:

State 1: relationship between repo spreads and the US 10-year yield
𝛿
𝑟t|St−1
= 𝑐1 + 1 𝑈𝑆10𝑌𝑡 + 1𝑡

1𝑡 N (0,1)

(2)

2𝑡 N (0,1)

(3)

State 2: relationship between repo spreads and the US 10-year yield
𝛿
𝑟t|St−2
= 𝑐2 + 2 𝑈𝑆10𝑌𝑡 + 2𝑡

I specify the two-state Markov process for the second test - repo spreads and the TED spread - as
follows:

State 1: relationship between repo spreads and the TED spread
𝛿
𝑟t|St−1
= 𝑐1 + 1 (𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡3𝑀 − 𝑟𝑡3𝑀 ) + 1𝑡

1𝑡 N (0,1)

(4)

State 2: relationship between repo spreads and the TED spread
𝛿
𝑟t|St−2
= 𝑐1 + 2 (𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡3𝑀 − 𝑟𝑡3𝑀 ) + 2𝑡

1𝑡 N (0,1)

(5)

The corresponding transition probability matrix for the two-state Markov process is estimated as:
p p 
P   11 21 
 p12 p22 

(6)

Markov switching estimation results for 1) repo spreads as a function of the US 10-year
yield, and 2) repo spreads as a function of the TED spread, are shown in Table 4.
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In order to minimize autocorrelation as measured by Durbin-Watson (DW), the models are
optimized with AR(1) and AR(2) terms. The Schwarz information criterion (SIC) is also
optimized. Where the DW and SIC were not simultaneously optimized, DW optimization was
prioritized as SIC deterioration was de minimis.

….. insert Table 4 around here …..

The estimations show strong evidence of state dependence. The state dependence of repo
spread relationships with collateral values proxied by the US 10-year yield closely track the time
periods of the MBP regressions. State 1 - the subordinate state – tracks closely Period 1 of the
MBP regressions. In State 1, the estimated TC and MC repo spread coefficients are strongly
negative and statistically significant. State 2 tracks closely Period 2 in the MBP regressions. In
State 2, the dominant state, the coefficients are much weaker, but still statistically significant. TC
spreads have a weak positive association, while MC spreads have a weak, negative association
with the US 10-year yield. As with MBP regressions, the MS states correspond closely to the
periods before and after the commencement of LSAPs, providing further evidence of a structural
change associated with the start of the secured lending regime.

In both states, these estimated results indicate little evidence of a collateral supply effect in
which collateral risk perceptions are transmitted to repo spreads. In State 1, if there were a
collateral supply effect, we would expect to observe a positive association between repo spreads
and bond yields. Instead, we observe a strong negative association, suggesting the alternative
explanation that rising tri-party repo spreads are driving deflationary expectations and lower longterm bond yields. In the raw data, we observe sharply declining bond yields in 2007-2008. In State
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2, the weak, variable associations between repo spreads and the US 10-year yield provide no
evidence of a collateral supply effect. Taking States 1 and 2 together, Markov switching analysis
corroborates MBP regressions finding no evidence of a collateral supply effect. As the state
switches largely correspond to the periods before and after the commencement of LSAPs, the
estimations support the hypothesis that the Fed’s repo market support structures – part of the
secured lending regime – have effectively neutralized collateral risk in tri-party repo markets.

Similar to the US 10-year yield Markov switching estimations above, Markov switching
analysis of repo spreads and the TED spread yields strong evidence of state dependence. The
association between repo spreads and the TED spread shows states that correspond closely to the
MBP-detected breaks in the linear relationships. In State 1, the subordinate state that corresponds
to Period 1 in the MBP regressions, the relationships of TC and MC spreads with TED is strongly
negative and statistically significant. In State 2 - the dominant state - the relationships between
repo spreads and TED is inconsistent, as the TC and MC estimated coefficients are positive and
negative, respectively. Since State 2 largely corresponds with the secured lending regime, the
estimated coefficients are inconsistent with the hypothesis that repo spreads and TED are
negatively associated. However, there is strong evidence of state dependence related to secured
lending regime implementation.

Graphical illustration of Markov switching results provide additional perspective on the
relationships among TC and MC spreads with the US 10-year yield and TED spread. Prior to the
secured lending regime, severe volatility appears to drive the state switching process. Following
the GFC, two repo spread observations are evident outliers. These outliers represent the December
31, 2018 bank balance sheet “window dressing”, and the September 17, 2019 repo spike. The latter
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event was addressed promptly by the Fed through the resumption of LSAPs in order to push
liquidity toward gaps in banks’ reserve holdings. Additionally, the Fed accelerated plans to
establish a standing repo facility (SRF) in order to mitigate future events.

….. insert Figures 3 – 6 around here …..

To summarize, the Markov switching process adds robustness to MBP regression. The
estimations corroborate the finding of no collateral supply effect in tri-party repo. Additionally,
the estimations provide further evidence of a structural change in the relationship between repo
spreads and counterparty risk following commencement of the secured lending regime.

6. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that secured lending regime measures implemented by the Fed have
increased stability in tri-party repo markets. MBP regression provides strong evidence that repo
spreads contract during periods of elevated counterparty risk, indicating investors view tri-party
repo as a close substitute to Treasury bills. MBP regression and Markov switching analysis also
provide evidence that the collateral supply effect is inoperative, meaning that fluctuations in
collateral values do not impact lender perceptions of tri-party repo risk.

The key policy supporting collateral values in the secured lending regime is large scale
asset purchases (LSAPs). These began in December 2008 in order to provide further monetary
policy accommodation at the zero lower bound. While evidence LSAPs’ effectiveness as monetary
policy easing is scant (Thornton, 2015), the Fed continues to adhere to the easing rationale.
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Repo market instability, not monetary policy, has appeared to be the primary catalyst for
energetic LSAP activity on two occasions: the September 2019 repo rate spike and the March 2020
Covid-driven Treasury market volatility event. The Fed did adjust monetary policy I response to
the Covid-19 crisis, but only Treasury market instability explains the extraordinary LSAPs of
March and April. These reactions were motivated by unstable market conditions, but had the effect
of reducing interest rates. This paper provides evidence that investors understand that the Fed
underwrites repo market stability with all its available resources.
The Fed’s large balance sheet and its position as an ongoing participant in both short-term
and long-term funding markets appear to be the price of maintaining repo market stability. It must
not only manage carefully the balance between bank reserves and bond supply, but also must
intervene massively in long-term bond markets whenever market liquidity evaporates. As a result,
the Fed must maintain an ever-expanding balance sheet. The events of September 2019 and March
2020 show that the Fed will not tolerate disorderly Treasury markets. Expectations of ongoing Fed
support for government bond markets lead to moral hazard, as leveraged Treasury investors
position themselves more aggressively given the expectation that the Fed will bail them out of
Treasury market volatility, increasing systemic risk.
There are additional problems with the Fed’s position as Treasury market underwriter.
First, the Fed acting continuously as borrower and lender in short-term debt markets raises the
prospect that the Fed is impacting credit allocation. That credit allocation should be the sole
purview of the private sector is a longstanding Fed principle. However, the Fed acknowledges
purchases of Agency MBS securities impacts credit allocation by changing the price of MBS
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securities, reducing their yield (Martin and Shulhofer-Whol, 2018). Selgin (2020) maintains that
Fed credit-allocation activities erode the principle of Fed independence from the fiscal authority.

The second problem is the Fed has potentially reduced its ability to fight inflation with
interest rate increases due to policy asymmetry. Currently, the Fed is signaling policy tightening
by tapering LSAPs: rate increases won’t commence until LSAPs cease. While in a tightening phase
to combat inflation, what will the Fed do if Treasury market liquidity evaporates due to external
shock? It cannot allow the Treasury bond market to collapse when leveraged investors de-risk. The
Fed must flatten rates and commence LSAPs and forward guidance to restore investor confidence.
The next tightening cycle will be delayed by forward guidance and LSAP tapering. In this new
dynamic, mitigating repo market instability requires rapid easing when required, but tightening
must be slow, guided and deliberate. Coupled with the Fed’s new policy of reacting only to actual
rather than anticipated inflation, the Fed repo market support leads to an accommodatively-biased
policy stance.

Finally, providing ongoing support for Treasury markets may reduce long-term bond
yields, thereby corrupting markets signals that the government is nearing the limits of its fiscal
space. US government debt and deficit spending have proliferated, even outside the necessities
presented by financial crisis and recession. Government debt as a percentage of GDP has expanded
while nominal and real interest rates remain low. Until March 2020, government debt funding
costs had reliably declined during crises, allowing governments to expand deficit spending at low
cost. Rogoff (2020) suggests that the low interest rate environment does not present governments
with a free lunch because investors may yet balk at funding governments whose fiscal positions
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are deteriorating due to statutory debt and non-discretionary spending. Relying on collateralized
debt markets using safe assets will not work if investors deem the collateral unsafe.

The Fed has underwritten a secured short-term lending regime based on the presumption
of safe government debt. Persistent inflation and/or a crisis prompted by declining confidence in
government debt would be difficult for the Fed to manage. History shows the perceived safety and
acceptance of government bonds is not guaranteed under all circumstances. It was just 40 years
ago that US Treasuries were derided by private investors as “certificates of confiscation”. Further
study into understanding investor tolerance of fiscal imbalances would be helpful in developing
sustainable policies.
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Table 1: Data Summary Statistics

Mean

TC Repo MC Repo
spread
spread
0.152
0.207

US 10-yr
yield
2.820

TED
spread
0.439

Wilshire VIX
5000
19,250
19.133

US 1-mo.
yield
1.179

Median

0.095

0.121

2.630

0.310

16,316

16.220

0.170

Std Dev

0.227

0.310

1.110

0.438

7,844

9.376

1.580

Max

3.907

4.599

5.260

4.580

44,221

82.690

5.270

Min

(1.147)

(0.206)

0.520

0.090

6,858

9.140

0.000

Skewness 3.95

4.39

0.290

3.749

0.860

2.497

1.270

Kurtosis

35.31

34.33

2.33

22.577

3.02

11.58

3.35

ADF at
level
ADF at
first diff.

(8.82)

(7.41)

(1.64)

(3.75)

1.54

(5.04)

(0.98)

(21.84)

(23.12)

(47.91)

(15.92)

(20.22)

(36.81)

(21.93)

Source: Author’s own estimation based on data from Depository Trust Clearing Corporation (TC
spreads) and The St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank (FRED) (yield on US Treasuries and TED
spread). The sample period starts January 6, 2005 and ends May 4, 2021 (4112 daily
observations).
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Table 2: Changes in Treasury-collateralized repo spreads (TC) with changes in the US 10-year
Treasury note yield and the TED spread: Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint regression estimation of
Eq. 1.
Dependent variable
TC repo spread

Period 1

Period 2

Dates

1/6/2005-8/22/2007

8/23/2007-5/4/2021

# Observations

661

3451

Intercept
𝛽0

0.002
(0.385)

-0.001
(-0.241)

19.958
(2.091)**

-5.132
(-1.200)

-0.171
(-1.504)

-0.232
(-4.193)***

0.007
(1.709)*

-0.002
(-1.461)

-0.446
(-0.875)

0.295
(1.642)

-1.323
(-19.098)***

-0.530
(-11.425)***

0.115
2.364
-1.139

0.115
2.364
-1.139

∆(𝑟1𝛿 − 𝑟𝑡1𝑀 )

(t-statistics)

US 10-year yield (basis
points)
10𝑌
𝛽1 ∗ ∆𝑟𝑡+𝜏1
(t-statistics)

TED spread
3𝑀
3𝑀 )
𝛽2 ∗ ∆(𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡+𝜏2
− 𝑟𝑡+𝜏2
(t-statistics)

VIX
𝛽3 ∗ ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡+𝜏3 )
(t-statistics)

Wilshire 5000
𝛽4 ∗ ∆ log(𝑊𝐼𝐿𝑡+𝜏4 )
(t-statistics)

US 1-month yield
1𝑀 )
𝛽5 ∗ ∆(𝑟𝑡+𝜏5
(t-statistics)

Adjusted 𝑅2
DW
SIC
Source: as in Table 1.
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Table 3: Changes in Treasury-collateralized repo spreads (MC) with changes in the US 10-year
Treasury note yield and the TED spread: Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint regression estimation of
Eq. 1
Dependent variable
TC repo spread

Period 1

Period 2

Dates

1/6/2005-9/22/2008

9/23/2008-5/4/2021

# Observations

934

3178

Intercept
𝛽0

0.000
(0.033)

-0.001
(-0.479)

-32.766
(-3.405)***

-2.810
(-0.738)

-0.261
(-3.309)***

-0.323
(5.121)***

0.000
(-0.061)

-0.003
(-3.130)***

0.060
(0.121)

0.351
(2.232)**

-1.215
(-21.907)***

-0.507
(-7.927)***

0.225
2.46
-1.284

0.225
2.46
-1.284

∆(𝑟1𝛿 − 𝑟𝑡1𝑀 )

(t-statistics)

US 10-year yield (basis
points)
10𝑌
𝛽1 ∗ ∆𝑟𝑡+𝜏1
(t-statistics)

TED spread
3𝑀
3𝑀 )
𝛽2 ∗ ∆(𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡+𝜏2
− 𝑟𝑡+𝜏2
(t-statistics)

VIX
𝛽3 ∗ ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡+𝜏3 )
(t-statistics)

Wilshire 5000
𝛽4 ∗ ∆ log(𝑊𝐼𝐿𝑡+𝜏4 )
(t-statistics)

US 1-month yield
1𝑀 )
𝛽5 ∗ ∆(𝑟𝑡+𝜏5
(t-statistics)

Adjusted 𝑅2
DW
SIC
Source: as in Table 1.
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Table 4: Estimations of Two-State Markov Switching for changes in TC and MC repo spreads as
functions of the US 10-year yield and the TED spread

State 1
State 2
AR(1) term
AR(2) term
Log likelihood
Schwartz Info.
Durbin Watson
Constant transition
probability of staying in
State 1
State 2
Constant expected
durations
State 1
State 2

Changes in TC repo
spreads as a function of
changes in US 10-year
yield

Changes in TC repo
spreads as a
function of
changes in TED
spread

Changes in MC repo
spreads as a function
of changes in US 10year yield

Changes in MC
repo spreads as a
function of
changes in TED
spread

𝑐̂1 =4.491***(9.22)
𝑦̂1 =-48.893***(-16.582)
𝑐̂2 =0.925*(1.921)
𝑦̂2 =8.812***(3.51)
0.907
0.090
4288.197
-2.058
2.269

𝑐̂1 =3.086***(11.806)
𝑦̂1 =-0.400***(-11.439)
𝑐̂2 =0.452*(1.749)
𝑦̂2 =0.289***(8.566)
0.866
0.128
4297.878
-2.063
2.230

𝑐̂1 =3.022(0.571)
𝑦̂1 =-110.397***(-33.728)
𝑐̂2 =-2.072(-0.391)
𝑦̂2 =-4.983**(-2.122)
0.808
0.192
4506.340
-2.164
2.052

𝑐̂1 =2.683(0.943)
𝑦̂1 =-0.700***(-19.367)
𝑐̂2 =0.300(0.106)
𝑦̂2 =-0.252***(-8.104)
0.867
0.132
4213.773
-2.022
2.019

0.987
0.996

0.989
0.997

0.620
0.997

0.667
0.999

79.36
273.86

89.16
295.66

2.63
364.92

1.50
684.64

Source: as in Table 1.
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Figure 1: TC Spreads, US Treasury 10-year Yields, and TED Spread
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Figure 2: MC Repo spreads, US 10-year yield, TED spread.
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Figure 3: Markov switching filtered regime probability: TC repo spreads and US 10-year yield.
Probability of remaining in the dominant regime.

Source: as in Table 1.
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Figure 4: Markov switching filtered regime probability: MC repo spreads and US 10-year yield.
Probability of remaining in the dominant regime.

Source: as in Table 1.
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Figure 5: Markov switching filtered regime probability: TC repo spreads and TED spread.
Probability of remaining in the dominant regime.

Source: as in Table 1.
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Figure 6: Markov switching filtered regime probability: MC repo spreads and TED spread.
Probability of remaining in the dominant regime.

Source: as in Table 1.

